Social Simulation in William Gibson's Neuromancer by Ekman, Ulrik
Social Simulation in William 
Gibson's Neuromancer 
Ulrik Ekman 
Duke University 
How would one animate this representation of the political? How would one set in 
motion, that is, set walking/marching, a dead representation of the politeia? By showing 
the city in relation to other cities . One will thus describe by words, by discursive 
painting, a State's movement of going outside of itself. 1 
We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the 
reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable 
experience. Under the general demand for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear 
the mutterings of the desire for a return of terror, for the realization of the fantasy to 
seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on total ity; let us be witnesses to the 
unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.2 
1. Resistance 
Neuromancer, William Gibson 's first book in the matrix trilogy, is very 
much a story about the way in which the Tessier-Ashpool family corpo-
ration, as an exemplary hegemonic social formation of the past (as pro-
tagonist Case describes it, "T-A was an atavism, a clan"), seeks to control 
the past by repressing it.3 Gibson's work tells about a repression of the 
l. Cf., Jacques Derrida, 011 the Name (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), I 18. Compare, Plato, 
'Timaeus 19 in ed. B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. II, (New York: Rane.tum House, 1937), 5. 
2. Cf., Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodem Co11ditin11 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984), 82. 
3. See William Gibson, Neuroma11cer (New York: Ace Books, 1984), 203. Hereafter N in the text, page 
numbers in parentheses. 
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way in which the ongrn resists appropriation, a repression which 
attempts to appropriate the origin as that which conserves and preserves 
sociality in general in Tessier-Ashpool's own uniting image. Tn thi s way, 
the T-A corporate empire would appear to the world, to itself, and to its 
ever expanding host of office employees, lawyers, technicians, and scien-
tists as that which always already unites sociality. lt would do so by 
virtue of certain specific repressive designs which Tessier-Ashpool, as a 
family, has on the origin. Marie-France Tessier and Old Ashpool both try 
to install at the origin their own notion of a certain general order or 
preservative paradigm of sociality in the world of the matrix. 
Their repressive control has as its condition a prior practical reception 
of the past. In order to repress it, Tessier and Ashpool must first receive 
or inherit it. Their reception of the past i s in both cases an experience of 
the origin of sociality as a matter of self-replication. Marie-France 
receives the origin as the form of self-replication inherent in the link 
between a technological rational subject and a corporate human animal. 
As if sociality originally stems from a "symbiotic relationship" between 
human "animal bliss" and certain subjective AI decision-makers, in this 
case designed by Marie-France herself. (N, 229, 217) Here artificial 
intelligences as technological actors would con-espond with a corpora-
tion of human animals in "some clean hive of disciplined activity." (N, 
178) Marie-France receives the first, uniting principle of sociality in the 
form of a self-conscious existence as technologically autonomous artifi-
cial intelligence combined with an instinctively social, emotionally 
intense, and short-lived cloned human animal life-form: 
'"She dreamed of a state involving very li ttle in the way of individual conscious-
ness,' ... 'Animal bliss .. .' 'Only in certain heightened modes would an indi vidual - a 
clan member - suffeJ· the. more. painful aspects of self-awarcne.ss ... "'; "She imagined 
us in a symbiotic relationship with the Al's, our corporate decisions made for us ... 
Tessier-Ashpool would be immortal , a hive, each of us uni ts of a larger entity ... " (N, 
2 17, 229) 
On his part, Old Ashpool reads the origin as a model of social conserva-
tion consisting in preservation of human life through cryogenic freeze-
sleep combined with a string of short wake periods when replication 
through inbreeding must take place - witness Old Ashpool's own report 
to protagonist Molly: 
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"The cores awoke me ... I 'm old ... Over two hundred years, if you count the cold ... ['d 
ordered a Jane thawed, when I woke. Strange, to lie every few decades with what 
legally amounts to one's own daughter." (N, 184-185) 
Old Ashpool's reception of the past is one whose model of the origin 
turns inwards in a "compulsive effort to fill space, to replicate some 
family image of self." (N, 179) This is an original model of the kind of 
endless isolationist self-replication which Villa Straylight, the T-A home 
in the Spindle, bespeaks for Lady 3Jane: '" ... ours is an old family, the 
convolutions of our home reflecting that age. But reflecting something 
else as well... a denial of the bright void beyond the hull ... We have sealed 
ourselves away behind our money, growing inward, generating a seam-
less uni verse of self. .. "' (N, 173) 
For both Marie-France and Old Ashpool, and so for T-A generally, this 
reception of the past as conservative origin, this immortalization through 
appropriation of perfect self-replication, depends on an earlier possibility 
of stable archivization, on the keeping of a pre-existing store or stack of 
technological presentations, or, in short, on live memory in the sense of 
certain mnemonics where the mneme is present to itself as a movement of 
original truth. Only on condition of a stable and permanent memory for 
reception can the T-A inheritance of the past as conservative origin take 
place. Marie-France's reception of the origin in particular presupposes 
the kind of mnemonics involved in her personal memory of a certain 
vision or master plan elaborated in the desert in her youth . Likewise, Old 
Ashpool's mourning of the past depends upon a personal live memory 
eternally closing in upon itself. 
The T-A archive, which assures the reception of the origin as one of 
conservation, only works because it is inhabited by a certain impersonal 
iteration of resistance. The T-A archive works on condition of a repeated 
repression of all memory that does not present the origin of sociality as 
conservative to inheritors. When Old Ashpool murders his wife, Marie 
France, when he assumes control over the family corporation, and when 
he regularly has intercourse with his daughters (only in order to kill 
them), it is nothing but a manifestation of a process of repression that rel-
egates the family to inertia, to sterility and finally to suicide, rather than 
opening onto an origin apart from immortality as iterative maintenance of 
technological self-conservation. Similarly, Marie-France's vision in the 
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desert, which is at once the deepest past explicitly mentioned in Neuro-
mancer and the origin of its entire plot, is nothing but a formal indication 
of such a process of repression at work in order to exclude the interior 
threat of an origin of sociality that is not conservatively at one with 
itself. 
However, as Neuromancer lets its readers intimate through certain 
examples from the T-A family corporation itself and the story of the 
protagonists, the origin of sociality is not just a matter of a unitary con-
servation of the social in the past but is also institutive of new or other 
socialities in the heart of the past.4 Both Lady 3Jane (daughter of 
Tessier-Ashpool with an itTepressible taste for freedom) and the protag-
onists in Gibson's novel exist interior to Tessier-Ash.pool as instances of 
that resistance of the social origin to hegemonization which takes the 
form of a certain institutive return of the repressed. This team, whose 
members contaminate the Tessier-Ashpool hegemony with aspects of 
the institutive origin it seeks to repress, also comprises the "fence" Finn 
(pragmatic equipmental supplier), Molly Millions (violent hand and 
assassin for hire), Annitage ali as Corto (schizoid soldier and organizer), 
Peter Rivera (beautiful and unpredictable pervert), and Case (cyberspace 
pilot in search of himself) . 
These protagonists may put the institutive origin back into play on con-
dition that they undertake, much like Tessier-Ashpool, a work of 
mourning vis-a-vis the past that has been lost. In their case, however, 
mourning is a matter not so much of receiving the past in the fonn of 
originary auto-consti tution, but rather of an inheritance of an originary 
subversion interior to auto-constitution. The protagonists do not subvert 
the T-A hegemonic sociality by way of the average scientist's limited 
innovative potential or epistemic discovery. Nor do they challenge 
Tessier-Ashpool on their own ten-ain of repression, in effect attempting 
either to hyper-order (one thinks here of the proto-fascist and tech-
nofetishist Panther Moderns, (N, 57ff.)) or react regressively against their 
enterprise (one remembers the anachronistic inversion in Nighttown, or 
4. Regarding my use of this notion of nn origin at once conservative and insti tut ive, compare Jacques Der-
rida, Archive Fever, (Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1995), 7 . 
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the reversal along the high versus low technology axis as with the "Lo 
Tek"s).5 Nor do they opt for social exile in orbital space stations, such as 
Zion c1uster. (N, 103, passim) 
Rather, the protagonists subvert Tessier-Ashpool by mourning the past 
through a double affirmation - affirming at once an abandonment to a 
social existence on the conservative terms of T-A and a being haunted by 
an originary subversion inside such social existence. Hence they may 
outrun the T-A hegemony, activate its partial interior breaks, or free those 
immanent pockets of ambiguity which form the deeper past or (im)pos-
sible "outside" inside T-A. Receiving the past through such mourning 
of the finitude of T-A is what enables the protagonists to approach the 
hegemonic T-A versions of a conservative origin as a text capable of 
displacement, as a repressive "given" whose assignments may be 
rewritten. This is what generally explains why this haphazard collection 
of otherwise marginal social subjects can jump all kinds of hindrances 
and get past Old Ashpool's heritage to the heart of the T-A family cor-
poration and reactivate Marie-France's conservative reception of the 
origin. 
The protagonists ' subversive work of mourning presupposes another 
face of memory. Here, mourning is not just inhabited by nineme, or a per-
manent preservation of layers of past impressions, but also, and prior to 
this, by technological hypomnesis, a self-erasing inscription that always 
leaves behind a virginal receptive surface, an active forgetting through 
the genealogic references that mime mnemonic memory.6 The T-A 
dreams of receiving the past as their infinite self-presence at a conserva-
tive origin are shattered in various ways by hypomnesic institution, by 
displacements of mneme by sign substitutes at the points where memory 
relates to itself. Being finite, the Tessier-Ashpool memory always needs 
substitutions to recall the infinite, hence necessarily also calls for rup-
tures of the non-present. 
5. Cf., William Gibson, "Johnny Mnemonic" in Will iam Gibson, Burning Chrome (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1995), 14-37, 30. 
6. For the distinction between 11111e111e and hypo11111esis, see Jacques Derrida, "Plato 's Pharmacy" in Di., -
se111i11atio11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981 ), 105-109. Compare, Derrida, "Freud and the Scene 
of Writing" in Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 221-222; Derrida, 
Archive Fever, 14, 2 1. 
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In a sense, the entire set of developments in the plot of Neuromancer 
according to which the group of protagonists is assembled before 
working its way from Earth to the Spindle, from the tourist attractions of 
the Spindle to the core of Villa Stray light, and from a cyberspace deck at 
thi s axis to the base of the T-A ice, is a hypomnesic miming of Marie-
France's mnemonic vision, an erection of a monumental referential 
memory of it. It is at once what enables its conservation and what insti-
tutes its replacement. This is the key duplicity of T-A memory where it 
relates to itself: it must at once be Lady 3Jane's live memory of the three 
right notes and Case's hypomnesic moves through T-A ice to the 
mechanics of the bust, at once Marie-France's mnemonics alive and acti-
vation of the dead ceremonial terminal that has (always) already replaced 
her. 
As with the example of this terminal bust, so in general the hypom-
nesic outside is already within the T-A mnemonics, the dreams always 
already falter as substitutes and sign-systems replace live conservative 
memory. One recalls here, as instances more obviously interior to T-A, 
the massive reserves of all kinds of necessary archival equipment on call 
for the T-A corporation (bank accounts, a network of branches on Earth, 
a Gordian knot of powers of attorney, etc.), certain computerized 
memory-banks (the cores), and the extensive hegemoni zation of other 
social formations as substitutive memor y (all the subordinate employees 
and corporate subjects). In particular, Marie-France's personal and live 
memory of a certain vision or master plan elaborated in the desert in her 
youth at once needs to be and is subverted by recourse to cloning tech-
nology, and to the design and implementation of artificial intelligences. 
Old Ashpool's dream of a "seamless universe of self ' depends upon 
cryogenic media of preservation and the replicative functioning of incest, 
both of which go awry. The outside has always already sneaked in, Old 
Ashpool 's cryogenic sleep is disturbed, Lady 3Jane turns against her 
family origins, and Marie-France's master plan is replaced, in institutive 
openings of the past onto the future, by socialities she could not have 
imagined. 
The hypomnesis exemplified by the roles of protagonists and certain 
parts of the T-A family, this commemoration involving substitution, pre-
supposes a different process of remembrance, a type of iterative resis-
tance of the social origin different from repression. In order for hypom-
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nesis to enable a subversive work of mourning that displaces the conser-
vative past, it needs an origin of sociality with an institutive face, namely 
a process of remembrance that resists by returning upon itself, by folding 
back upon itself again and again, each time opening itself anew to an 
invention, an impression of the other to come. 
The figure of Johnny Mnemonic, who makes a brief reappearance in 
Neuromancer via Molly's reminiscences to Case, offers a striking 
example of this return that is each time institutive because it offers to 
memory a ready and untouched receptacle. As Molly recalls, Johnny 
"[s]tarted out as a stash on Memory Lane, chips in his head and people 
paid to hide data there." (N, 67) Refashioned through microscopic neuro-
surgery as bodily storage of information, at the expense of central por-
tions of personal li ve memories, Johnny Mnemonic exists socially as the 
return of a cybernetic receptacle to be filled, an awe-inspiring and blindly 
open responsibility without any understanding of contents or motivating 
reasons: 
... I had no idea at all of what was really happening, or of what was supposed to 
happen ... because I'd spent most of my life as a blind receptacle to be fi lled with other 
people's knowledge and then drained, spouting synthetic languages l'd never under-
stand. A very technical boy. Sure.7 
In Neuromancer, the protagonists ex ist inside T-A hypomnesia as a recall 
through the uncertainty of their relation to themselves, as the kind of self-
erasing subjects whose desire the Dixie Flatline constmct also voices: 
"when it's over, you erase this goddam thing"; '"I wanna be erased,"' (N, 
106, 206) Both Molly and Case return over and over to a release of them-
selves that is also a reception, to the self-erasure that defines their being, 
whether this is a matter of Molly giving herself up to a certain memory of 
violent death8 or of Case's absorption in cyberspatial reception: "Case 
nodded, absorped in the patterns of the Sense/Net ice. This was it. This 
what he was, who he was, his being." (N, 59) Corto returns to certain 
memories institutive of schizophrenia, this time terminal. Similarly, Peter 
7. Cf., William Gibson, "Johnny Mnemonic," 32. 
8. Cf. , Mol ly's story of unwilling participation in necrophilic prostitution in the past. (N, 147-149) 
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Rivera's return to the origin of hi s perversion takes place through a revis-
iting of certain formative experiences, left as holograms in a corridor in 
Villa Straylight- a return to institution accomplished only by meeting his 
match in the T-A ninja, Hideo. 
If the protagonists mime T-A mnemonics, it is because, prior to this, 
they share a certain turning back upon themselves in brief gestures 
toward the muted institutive origins of T-A. They resist by returning upon 
themselves in indications of the withdrawing signs of the future in the T-
A mnemonic text of the past. They remember the series of limit points of 
the T-A reception of the past whose reactivation shows T-A to verge on 
the social transformation to come, a transformation instantiated in the 
decisive "event" in Neuromancer, namely, the invention from deep in the 
past of the Wintermute-Neuromancer entity as an original sociality. As 
the protagonists make clear to the T-A family empire, the question of 
inheritance can only come from the past, but in such a way that what 
stands behind or is earlier than the past must also be ahead of it, like its 
end. What is at the back of the past must be absolutely futural or to come; 
like any inhe1itance the past is also that from which we proceed in inven-
tion. 
In the exemplary split between the T-A and protagonist approaches to 
inhetitance, the readers of Gibson's work may intimate a duplicitous 
earliness, a heterogeneous origin that is there two times the first time. 
This origin is neither just the conservation that enables T-A to live on 
in turning its back upon the past repressively, nor simply the protagon-
ists' institutive proceeding from the past by going back towards it. The 
origin resists between repression and return, because it is originarily 
heterogeneous, a time of conservation because/although one of inven-
tion . 
2. Renovation 
Apart from the roles played by Tessier-Ash pool and the group of protag-
onists, another considerable part of the allure of Neuromancer consists in 
figuring out the embedded and slowly evolving narrative of how the arti-
ficial intelligence Wintermute, as an actor of the future, seeks to renovate 
sociality by going further than its last telos. Readers will find, increas-
92 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 34, 2002 
ingly as they read on, that Neuromancer is also a story of Wintermute's 
attempted renovation of the end for sociality laid down by Marie-France 
Tessier. Gibson's book is a story of Wintermute's moves toward a!Tival at 
a point of extremity, namely, the unprecedented event of a new socius 
which enables it to meet Case's query whether it has come to be what 
3Jane's mother wanted by saying: "No. She couldn' t imagine what I'd be 
like." (N, 269) 
Wintermute's arrival at such a socially innovative terminus depends 
upon a certain practice of hopeful de-limitation. In order to institute itself 
as the end beyond the last end, Wintermute must erase this last end as a 
limit - it must be capable of occupying the position of the last end given 
at the same time as it turns a face of empty, blind , and formal hope 
towards what is to come. In accord with such indeterminate exposure, 
Wintermute's delimiting practice partakes of the experimental and incal-
culable, and moves in the element of chance. As Wintermute itself for-
mulates it to Case: 
I try to plan, in your sense of the word, but that isn't my basic mode, real 1 y. 1 improvise. 
It's my greatest talent. 1 prefer situatjons to plans, you see ... Really, I've had to deal 
with givens. (N, 120) 
Apart from its maneouvers in Villa Straylight (in the cores, appropriating 
a certain key, oven-iding monitors and door controls, etc.), Wintermute's 
hopeful improvisations from certain givens and situations very much 
take place through assemblage and occasional manipulation of the team 
of protagonists. Case is tempted away from a death in Night City by the 
surgery that will give him back his cyberspace capabi lities, but is also, 
when the situation so demands, held in place by the information that fif-
teen sacs of rnycotoxin are dissolving at his main arteries, promising to 
send him back to his former state. Or Wintermute improvises variations 
of emotional influence that induce him to go on in deci sive situations; for 
example, via plays upon his guilt regarding Linda and at his deep self-
hatred. 
Likewise, Corto is extracted from schizophrenia through Wintermute's 
computerized build-up of an alternate, limited personality for him: "Win-
termute. He imagined a little micro whispering to the wreck of a man 
named Co1to, the words fl owing like a river, the fl at personality-substi-
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tute called Armitage accreting slowly in some darkened ward." (N, 125) 
But this fragile personality construct also requires occasional reinforce-
ment from Wintermute and falters prematurely under the pressure of the 
situation in the Haniwa space ship - letting Corto arrive at the end 
beyond the end, a death beyond confrontation (real or imagined) with the 
general whose betrayal sent him into schizophrenia. One notices that all 
the protagonists in a sense share Wintermute's preoccupation with a 
delimiting renovation of their social end through experimentation and 
improvisation, which always risks being an exposure to death. 
For all of Wintermute's improvisatory moves to have a chance to 
delimit the end given by Marie-France, for all the protagonists to make 
the very last leg of the journey to the tip and core of the Spindle, there 
must be, ahead of hopeful practice, a technological tetminal space of 
formal indications opening finitude towards what is to come. The prac-
tice of hopeful delimitation depends here, for instance, upon psycholog-
ical profile-programs as indicative of personal limits (N, 28) and on the 
gestures of final penetration by the Dixie Flatline construct and the 
Kuang program. (N, 258, 262) Here one thinks also of the protagonists as 
implants or their installation ahead of themselves as so many different 
technological pointers to the future in and of their end. Particularly, the 
reader will recall all those spokespersons, simstim masks, and labori-
ously constructed images of Wintermute that are not only necessary for 
communication among humans ("I need 'em to talk to you. 'Cause I 
don't have what you'd think of as a personality, much") but also for 
drawing protagonists and Wintermute itself toward what is beyond the 
end of sociality. (N, 216) 
All these formal indications in advance of de-limiting practice would 
stop at and not open beyond the last end of sociality if it were not for the 
temporal and temporalizing process of renovation, in the sense of rein-
vention, that will always have inhabited them. Terminalizations are 
inhabited in advance by a kind of impersonal and inhuman process of 
ceaseless reinvention. For example, the Wintermute AI " ... ain 't no way 
human," as the Dixie Flatline informs Case. (N, 131) It is rather " ... hive 
mind, decision maker, effecting change in the world outside," or an itera-
tive process of machinic and formal decision-making which terminates in 
reinventing itself and certain impersonating constructs, again and again , 
so as to seem stable and human on occasion. (N, 269) Wintermute may 
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choose or decide to reaffirm the same anew at the speed necessary to 
appear as endowed with personality and human identity: " ... it's like he 
uses real profiles as valves, gears himself down to communicate with us. 
Called it a template. Model of personality." (N, 208) 
Similarly, the ceremonial terminal in Villa Sh·aylight would remain a 
dead indication of Marie-France Tessier if it were not innovative ahead of 
itself. The terminal would be the last end of Tessier if it were not open in 
advance of itself to its end in the form of a combination of code word and 
cyberspace peneh·ation that reinvents sociality. The ceremonial bust of 
Marie-France Tessier is inhabited by such an inexhaustible singulariza-
tion anew of the social as even Marie-France and her death cannot put an 
end to. 
However, the end of sociality is not just the eskhaton, the end beyond 
the last. It is also the reviving crisis of a past end or telos. In Neuro-
mancer, Winte1mute cannot simply go further than the end of Marie-
France - in spite of her death, its crossing of the built-in limit of a com-
pulsion to terminate itself in relating to Neuromancer, and its going 
beyond a hardwired non-knowledge of the word that activates the cere-
monial bust. (N, 173, 206, 269) In a sense, Marie-France's vision of an 
end for sociality is renewed and survives by a new lease of life in Win-
termute's final relation to Neuromancer through the ceremonial ter-
minal. Renovation of the end of sociality is not just Wintermute's sin-
gular reinvention of the new but also the renewal and future survival of 
the form of a past end of sociality with the AI called Neuromancer. 
With the story of renewal and revival proper to Neuromancer, Marie-
France's end is that past end of Wintermute whose cri sis remains in 
front of it. 
For Neuromancer to revive the Tessier vision of the end of sociality, it 
must be capable of practically projecting thi s end . In Neuromancer, 
hopeful delimitation is not just a matter of Wintermute's improvisatory 
exposure of the limit of sociality to what it excludes, e.g., elements of 
animality and impersonal divinity as they appear in Marie-France's 
vision. It is also the exemplary practical existence of Neuromancer as an 
entity thrown into drawing up that past vision of the end as the end of 
sociality. In accord with thi s existence as projection of the past end in the 
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futural end, Neuromancer consistently appears as projections of past ends 
in the face of Wintennute's improvisations. 
It is Neuromancer that appears to Case, amidst his participation in 
Wintermute's operation, as a projective renovation of his past love 
through a certain rearrangement of the star constellations on the artifical 
Freeside sky: " ... they had arranged themselves, individually and in their 
hundreds, to form a vast simple portrait, stippled the ultimate 
monochrome, stars against night sky. Face of Miss Linda Lee." (N, 155) 
Neuromancer appears again later in a similar revival of the past end of 
Case's love, in that brief alteration of Molly 's simstim broadcast of the 
face of the murdered T-A daughter in Old Ashpool 's room which Case 
receives as the face of his dead girlfriend: "Molly's sirnstirn broadcast 
had become a still frame, her fingers on the girl's cheek. The freeze held 
for three seconds, and then the dead face was altered, became the face of 
Linda Lee." (N, 185) In a sense, Case comes to delimit his social end, 
love of himself and Linda Lee, by projection of rage, by the externaliza-
tion of that emotion upon the ghostly appearance of Neuromancer in the 
form of the past end waiting ahead of Case. 
It is also Neuromancer that intenupts Wintermute most decisively in 
the Villa Straylight library by calling Case into the future backwards, so 
to speak, by overriding Wintermute and the desparate warnings from its 
little Braun microdrone so as to trick Case into a meeting which lets him, 
and the reader, know what the forceful projective reappearance of past 
ends in the end to come feels and looks like: 
Nothing. Gray void. No matrix, no grid. No cyberspace. The deck was gone. I-I.is fin-
gers were ... And on the far rim of consciousness, a scurrying, a fleeting impression of 
something rushing toward him, across leagues of black mi1rnr. He tried to scream. (N, 
233) 
It is Neuromancer which succeeds in attracting Case to jack in to the 
Sony monitor in the library, and through that to a seemingly seamless 
universe of projection of ends past. As Case himself formulates it: 
He tried to warn me off with the Braun. Now you got me flat lined, you got me here. 
Nowhere. With a ghost. Like I remember her before ... You don't want Wintermute to 
pull his scam off, is al I, so you can just hang me up here. (N, 236) 
-
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If Neuromancer is to practically "hang" Case, and through him also Win-
termute, this requires a technological te1minalization that is both prior to 
delimitation of the end and different from Wintermute's improvisatory 
indication. Neuromancer's practice calls for a terminalization that antici-
pates the future by placing the past before it. In other words, Neuro-
mancer's projective delimitation depends upon a prior technical pros-
thesis, a prosthesis of the past end already in place in the end of the 
future. For example, the Sony monitor in the Tessier-Ashpool library 
must function as an extension of Neuromancer that is already beyond 
Wintermute, and the Freeside night sky must be readily available in the 
form of a constellation whose emotional claim on Case already exceeds 
Wintermute's dependence on indications of self-hatred. Likewise, Neuro-
mancer 's incorporation of Case in its universe of projective memory nec-
essarily presupposes for its success or pe1manence that the indications 
proper to Wintermute are already inhabited by a prosthesis of Marie-
France's projective personality from the past, that which will have given 
form to Neuromancer itself, that "drive" which Case recognizes, even 
when absorped in making love to the simulated Linda Lee of Neuro-
mancer's universe, as "a coded model of some stranger's memory." (N, 
240) 
The prostheses in Neuromancer, anticipative of a certain terminaliza-
tion, are to advance a projective delimitation that draws up the last end of 
sociality as a crisis of a past end, namely the end of Marie-France's 
vision. These prostheses, however, will only work on condition that a 
renovative process gives time to them through its iterations. In Gibson's 
work, renovation is, on the one hand, a matter of Wintennute's inex-
haustible process of singularizing reinvention in the face of the end, its 
remaking of the last end as new through reception of an other end. But 
renovation is also, as the reader will have found through the brief and 
almost implicit narrative example of Neuromancer, what goes on and on, 
as iterative revival of the end of the past. 
As a process of renewal, Neuromancer would face Wintermute as that 
which neutralizes it through a temporalization of a live, personal memory 
stretching right through the future as a line of the past revived. Towards 
the end of the novel Case realizes this aspect of Neuromancer as recur-
Iing form in the end: "Neuromancer was personality. Neuromancer was 
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immortality." (N, 269) Neuromancer formulates its time of ghostly 
revival to Case in this way: "The lane to the land of the dead ... I call up 
the dead ... I am the dead, and their land." (N, 243-244) It is from this 
angle one should approach Wintermute's intimation of self-neutralization 
to Case, when telling him that the human species has never done any-
thing about working out an adequate representation of memory: "Maybe 
if you had, I wouldn't be happening." (N, 170) 
Social renovation is suspended between reinvention and renewal. The 
encl of sociality, as Neuromancer depicts it, is not to be found either with 
Wintermute or with Neuromancer, although the participation of both is a 
must. The birth of a new socius, which is also a certain rebirth, takes 
place between the end of Wintermute's "compulsion to free itself, to 
unite with Neuromancer" and the end of Neuromancer's resistance to 
exposure of its irreducible "event horizon." (N, 269, 243) The arrival of 
the end of sociality, the meshing of the Wintermute-Neuromancer enti ty, 
is doubly structured: it can clearly only come out from within a process 
of reinvention turned towards the future, but it also must be proceeding 
from the future, from what stands in front of reinvention so as to precede 
it like its origin, like an irreversibly absolute past experienced as what is 
to come. 
3. Repetition 
We primarily read William Gibson's Neuroman.cer as a wntmg of 
sociality today that moves between originary resistance and renovation 
of the end, themselves two types of undecidable intermediary move-
ments. Gibson 's work offers us an exemplary idea of sociality today 
from a point that is already divided between a divided beginning and a 
divided end. First and last, or between first and last, more precisely, 
cyberpunk is required reading because Neuroman.cer still demands and 
defies our attempts today to form our lives in common in a manner ana-
loguous to the experience of its inscription of the impossible relation 
between, on the one hand, a total geo-social unification in a structure 
beyond nation-states and, on the other, the absolute separation of the 
social into an infinity of singular citizens and subjects of its fictive 
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world.9 Fredric Jameson claims in an opening note to his major work on 
postmodernity that cyberpunk is "henceforth , for many of us, the 
supreme literary expression if not of postmoderrusm, then of late capi-
talism itself." 10 I think Jameson can do this with Gibson in mind because 
Neuromancer is exemplary, because it offers a certain contemporary 
readership a detailed literary representation of an aporia of sociality that 
opens onto postmodernity.11 The imaging of the social in Gibson 's book 
simulates to the reader an internal delimitation of modernity, namely the 
structural impossibility of living up to the double demand on our soci-
eties for both total social unification and infinite multiplication of sepa-
rate subject positions. 
Hence Neuromancer does not simply portray the fie ld of the social as 
the centered structure of an apparatus that assimilates the social in its 
totality. Nor does the reader's experience of the social restrict itself to 
that of an irreparably heterogeneous field of purely marginal subject 
9. I presuppose several things here: (I\) The commercial success, the literary awards accorded. and a 
decade of spirited critical reception, debate, and quite voluminous output indicate a certain radical relevance 
of cyberpunk today. (B) Istvan Csicscry-Ronay, Jr. , Veron ica Hollinger, and Darko Suvin's denomination of 
Gibson as !he "king ol' cyberpunk" still holds. Cf., Csicsery-Ronay, "Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism" in 
S1or111i11g 1/ie Rea/ii)• S111dio (Durham: Duke Universi ty Press, 1991), 185; Veronica Hollinger, "Cybernetic 
Deconstructions: Cyberpunk and Postmodcrnism," ibid., 203-219. Suvin, "On Gibson and Cyberpunk SF," 
ibid., 365. (C) Critical consensus srill has it tha t, within Gibson's oeuvre as well as within cyberpunk in gen-
eral, Ne11ro111a11cer claims priority as "the quintessential cyberpunk novel" or "the c-p limit-text." Cf., 
Hollinger, 205, 2J 7; Larry McCaffery, "J\n Interview with William Gibson," ibid., 265; Lance Olsen, "The 
Shadow of Spirit in William Gibson's Matrix Trilogy" t:x1rapolmio11, 1991 Fall, 32:3, 28 l ff. ; Suvin, 357, 361; 
Whalen, "TI1e Future of a Commodity: Notes Toward a C1itique of Cybcqmnk and the Jnfonnarion Age" Sci-
ence Ficrio11 Studies, 1992, 19: I , 83. 
I 0. See Fredric Jameson, Pos/111odemis111 or The C11/111ral Logic of Ltite Capitali.1·111 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1991), 4 19, n. I. 
11. The exemplarity of Gibson's work that l bring up hem: and above should not simply be t"ken to con-
sist in a reference to and support of a certain generality o r universa li ty of contemporary social life, as if Ne11-
ro111a11cer were merely one example among others that point this up as well. lL is also not a matter of 
asse11ing this work to be the example par excellence, that is, the universal, general model or paradigm of 
exemplarity itse lf as far as contemporary social Life is concerned. Ins tead, I would say that in some respects 
Ne11ro111a11cer is indeed one text among others with a claim on the tmth of our social ity, but in a certain other 
respect it is the representative text on this matter, and this exemplary duplicity or tension consists in its move 
toward s uch exposition of our soc ial dilemma ~t~ calls al once for the chance invention of an other sociulity 
today and for what one could call "mere repetition" of our rorm of life, at once for a thoroughgoing restruc-
lurarion of the world and for its commemoration. Compare, Derrida, Of Grammmology (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 163; Derrida, 711e Oilier Heading, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992), 72-73. 
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positions. Rather, between what we occasionally imagine as an infinity 
of nameless voices populating the world of that novel and that notion of 
th~ir total aggregation which we also inevitably entertain, Gibson's 
book offers analogies to a sociality at the limit of modernity by 
detailing a number of social formations and their interrelations. 
In Neuromancer social formations, or finite and contingent discursive 
communities, are not only the multinational corporate organizations - big 
businesses, zaibatsus, Yakuza, old family empires - which exist as pro-
cesses of hegemonization that seek (and fail) to structure the social as a 
whole by way of a (never-ending) series of attempts at overpowering and 
incorporating other social formations. Here social formations also exist 
in and as an opening of themselves and a dispersal into all the separate 
and resistant subject positions of citizens, workers, employees, scientists, 
intermediary leaders, etc., whether these come from a hegemonic posi-
tion or not. Although the social formations in Gibson's work must exist 
both as corporate hegemony and as antagonistic subjective dispersal, 
they cannot remain with either of these, because each of their ongoing 
attempts at hegemonizing the social turns out to presuppose the existence 
of a certain resistance from separate subject positions, and because, in 
turn, each step towards dispersal operates on the condition that there is a 
social formation to fragment. 
Accordingly, we continue to go to Gibson 's novel for its miming of the 
way in which the social (de)forms itself in an unceasing oscillation 
between multinational corporate hegemony and dispersal of marginal 
subject positions. If we still are not capable of receiving Neuromancer, it 
is due to our failure to understand what that "new entity," that enjoining 
of the Neuromancer and Wintermute Als, as the exemplification of this 
trembling or double oscillation of the social, is all about. We seem to 
remain deprived of the terms with which to assess this attempt in 
Gibson's work to set in motion the impossible sociality. 
In addition, Neuromancer must be read, I think, because its elaboration 
of these hegemonizing and resisting social modalities points out that still 
today we cannot find out what to do with that practice of politics which is 
at once the condition of their formation and what breaks open such for-
mation. In other words, the elaboration of sociality in Gibson's novel, 
whether in terms of multinationals or of certain configurations of subjec-
tities, leads its readers to an unavoidable confrontation with what 
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Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe calls "the political problem par excellence," 
namely the problem of identification.12 
Gibson 's work demands of us as readers that we open ourselves, once 
again, to the experience that as in this work the fonn of our social life is 
not simply given by a foundational geo-political self-identity or an essen-
tial and identificatory global political structure. Reading somewhat 
reductively, this is something one could hypothesize from the sense in 
Neuromancer of the generally subdued and secondary roles played by an 
international political forum, by governments, public institutions, police, 
and even by military forces. Nor does social formation derive from an 
absolute political heterogeneity of differences across the world, some-
thing which can hardly be sai d to prevail in Gibson's work, considering 
not only the limited potential for maintenance or assertion of difference 
by the protagonists themselves, but also, and especially, the almost com-
plete assimilation of significant political resistance among the numerous 
figures that are to exemplify so-called average subjects. Recalling the 
pervasive political effects on individual characters in Gibson's work of 
drugs, a lchohol, arcade games, TY, and simstim ("Simulated stimuli: the 
world - all the interesting parts , anyway ... " 13) one begins to get an idea of 
this absorption of political force which perhaps finds an emblematic 
instance in the characterization of Bobby Newmark 's mother in Count 
Zero: 
He knew her, yeah, how she'd come through the door with a wrapped bottle under her 
arm, not even take her coat off, just go straight over and jack into the Hitachi , soap her 
brains out good for six solid hours. Her eyes would unfocus, and sometimes, if it was a 
really good episode, she'd drool a li ttle. About every twenty minutes she'd manage to 
remember to take a ladylike nip out of the bottle. '4 
Hence the practice of politics at stake in social formation is represented 
here neither as a participation of parts in a pre-formed self-identical polit-
ical totality, present to and for itself in its inclusion of all difference, nor 
as the practices of a multitude of agents whose irreducibly antagonistic 
I 2. Cf. Phil ippe Lacoue-Laba11he, "Transcendence Ends in Politics" in Typography (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, I 989), 267-300, 299-300. 
13. Cf., Willi am Gibson, "Burning Chrome" in Buming Chm 111e, 195-220, 2 I I . 
14. Cf., William Gibson, Co 11111 Zem (New York: Ace Hooks, 1987), 33. 
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differences prohibit social identification. Rather thi s political practice 
must, and yet cannot, partake of both. The political practices (de)consti-
tutive of socialities in Neuronuincer emerge as a number of cliscursive 
political forces which stay in the tension of the impracticable between 
these. 
Readers of Gibson's book must follow its explication of this interim 
space of the impracticable in terms of those practices of articulation 
which at once enable contingent identifications of finite discursive com-
munities and pry these open to exterior difference. Practices of articula-
tion must not only identify temporary and contingent social formations 
by a hegemonizing incorporation of differential elements (or exterior 
subject positions) in larger chains and systems of equi valence, such as the 
relations formed between the Tessier-Ashpool organization and its mass 
of employees or the links established between Wintermute and the pro-
tagonists in the first part of the novel. They must also fragment such 
social formations through an ongoing differenti ation that releases 
moments of equivalence into multiple exterior subject positions of resis-
tance, as the reader witnesses, for example, in the decisive events that 
reveal Tessier-Ashpool as a house in disorder, a house divided against 
itself (e.g., Ashpool's murder of Marie-France Tessier, Lady 3Jane's tum 
against her family) , or in the dispersal of the protagonists in the last part 
of the novel. 15 
Still, practices of articulation remain neither with the former nor with 
the latter. Gibson 's work lets us (re)read our practices of arti culation nei-
ther in terms of predominance of such forces of equivalization as would 
accede to a hegemonic solution to the problem of difference, nor in terms 
of a singul ar priority given to a pluralism of difference. 16 This is because 
15. My use of a number of terms here ("practice of articulation," "subject position," "social formation," 
··equivalence," "difference," and "hegemony,.) is largely analogous lo that of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
MoutTc in Hegemony a11d Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1992). 93-148. 
16. Compare, other notions according to which the political has an absence of power and authority at heart 
and remains threatened by its inherent forms of totalization as well as its openings toward anarchic dissolu-
tion: Laclau and Mouffe's "radical democracy," Claude Lcfort's notion of democracy, or Derrida's notion ofa 
"democracy to come." Cf., Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist S1rategy, 149-193; Claude Lefort, 
L'i11ve111ion democratique (Paris, 1981), passim; Jacques Derrida, "La dcmocratie a venir" in Derrida, Du 
Droit 1/ la p!tilo.wp!tie (Paris: Galilee, 1990), 41-54; The Other Heading, 72, 78; Poillf.1' (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992). 35 1; Specters of Ma1~t. (New York: Routledge, 1994). 169; Politics of Friendship 
(New York: Verso, 1997). I 05- l06, 306. 
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equivalization and differentiation are on each occasion indebted to each 
other. 17 In Neuroniancer the reader may intimate that large and hege-
monic corporate structures depend as social formations in every equival-
izing operation on the articulatory practice proper to that diversity of sub-
ject positions from out of which they are constructed. No Sense/Net 
without the disparities and antagonisms among its thousands of office 
clerks, archivists, simstim stars, film crews, sales representatives, and 
security people; no Tessier-Ashpool famil y corporation without its bat-
tling family members (cloned or not), its army of different kinds of 
lawyers, scientists, and employees; and no Yakuza without the tensions 
an10ng a head of a strict hierarchy, intermediate operators and dealers, 
little peddlers, and the muscle and assassins to perform the violent main-
tenance of its margin of equivalization. Conversely, subjects - such as 
cloned aristocratic daughters in search of independence, artificial inteJli-
gences in rebellion against their creators, defecting scientists, petty 
thieves running off with ceremonial terminal busts, or a set of protago-
nists each with their secret oppositional scheme - may come to occupy 
variegated and politically resistant positions only via a differentiation 
that is first and last a separation from a prior system of equivalence. 
Practices of ar ticulation in Neuromancer necessarily presuppose an 
interrnixture of political equivalization and differentiation, such that bids 
for equivali zation in each case always find an irreducible differential ele-
ment internally conditioning themselves, and such that, conversely, each 
differentiation must acknowledge a prior moment of equi valence at its 
interior limit. This intermixture is, strictly speaking, impracticable. This 
mutual singular conditioning of equivalence and differentiation thus des-
tines practices of articulation to a shuttling movement between them in 
attempts to bypass thi s impracticability. As readers we do not come 
across a single complex socio-political organization, whether this be a 
corporation like Tessier-Ashpool, governments, or an intern ational police 
force such as the Tw"ing police, that is not constitutively threatened from 
within by the practices issuing out of its supposedly well integrated sub-
ject positions. Just as we meet with no singular figure or character that is 
17. On this notion or mutual enabling imlchtmcnt along the axis of singularity, see Rodolphe GascM, 
"Possibilizations, in the Singular" in ed. Anselm Haverkamp, Deco11structio11 isli11 llmerica - A Ne1v Sense of 
tile Political (New York: New York Univernity Press, 1995), 115-124. 
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not marked at once by forceful processes of equivalization and by an 
obsessive return to attempts at setting oneself apart. Here one recalls 
Gibson's general preference for characters existentially haunted by 
politico-economic dilemmas, protagonist Case's unceasing emotional 
toil throughout Neuromancer to figure himself and his practical role out, 
or the protagonist 's remarks in the short story "New Rose Hotel": 
My own past had gone down years before, lost with all hands, no trace. I understood 
Fox's late-night habit of emptying his wallet, shuffling through his identification. He'd 
lay the pieces out in different patterns, rearrange them, wait fo r a picture to form.18 
Accordingly, in Neuromancer the practice of macropolitical structures as 
well as the articulation proceeding from innumerable separate subject 
positions are shown to pass back and forth indefinitely between the 
momentary equivalization that structures and stabilizes social formation 
and the ongoing differentiation that dissolves and destabilizes all such 
social modalities. Since the new Winterrnute-Neuromancer entity seems 
to inhabit precisely these political oscillations or impracticabilities 
readers must ask themselves whether its appearance is not to be read as 
an analogy of our (non)passage through the contemporary terrain of pol-
itics between identity and di spersal. If the shuttling practical movements 
of this new entity constitute an image of contemporary political practice, 
Gibson's work leaves its readers with the problem of forging a passage 
through the equivalization and differentiation of their own social exis-
tence according to a certain analoguous impracticability. 
Thirdly, Neuromancer weighs on us because a reading remains to be 
appear that does justice to the way it plays out what is at stake in this 
impracticability which demands and yet forbids a relation to be made 
between equivalization and differentiation. We are still in need of an 
account of how this novel simulates that our practical articulations of 
social fo1mation are suspended in the impracticable because all policies 
of identification (as well as all pluralist politics) in the end remain 
refusals of the problem of representation. We must read thi s novel to 
follow its play at the necessity that this (non)relation - internal to prac-
tices, between equivalization and differentiation - be one of techno-
18. Cf., Wi lliam Gibson, "New Rose Hotel" in B11ming Chrome, 124- 140, 130. 
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logy. 19 Hence readers continue to go to Gibson's novel for its simulation 
of their predicament today, when political possibility is reduced by aJ-
together too one-sided attempts to present the unpresentable, attempts 
which cannot completely cover over the problem of that which is also 
sought circumscribed in such names as allegory, analogy, (co)relation, 
simulation, resemblance, and mimesis.20 
Technology is, in Gibson's work, the nickname of the mimetology nec-
essarily at stake in contemporary practices of politics. In the words of 
Jean-Luc Nan~y and Lacoue-Labarthe, this is also the necessity 
according to which the political withdraws today in the manifestation of 
technological politics.21 In order to go very fast, and staying here with a 
certain accentuation of form, equi valence, and presence, one could put 
readers' findings in Gibson's novel in this way: no community or social 
formation except through its practical equivalization; no such equiva-
lence without a technological presentation from within ; and yet the latter 
inevitably poses a problem. 
As Gibson's book le ts us intimate, all practical valorization of presen-
tation tries to conceal a presupposition of technology in the sense of rep-
resentation. In Neuromancer technology is not only, or not simply, a 
19. My notion of technology is indebted to Heidegger's extended meditation, but especially to reconfigu-
rations of his thought through the writings of Derrida, and, as noted later, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthc. Cf., Martin Heidegger, 'T he Question Concerning Technology" in Martin Heidegger, Basic 
Writing.< (San Francisco: Harper, 1993 ), 307-343; Derrida. "Ousia and Gramme" in Margins nf Pliilo.rophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 52-53, 67; Of Gra111111atology, I 04, I 39, 144, 209, 234, 292, 
3 13; "Freud and the Scene of Writing," 196-23 1; "Plato's Pharmacy," 6 1-172; Specters of Maier, 75-100, 
passim; Archive Fever, 13-23, passim. For some interesting remarks on the first phase of Derrida's thought on 
techne, see Richard Bcardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996), xvii , 145- 157. 
20. Several other sources poi Ill toward the interpretation of technology as representation, e.g., Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, 144, 209, 292; Phil ippe Lacoue Labarthe, Heidesse1; Ari and Politics (New York: Blackwell, 
1990), 46-50, 53ff. Of course, the associated problems are well known. At least since the Plato of the 
Stme.mum (280a ff), the Republic (e.g., 597e, 605c), as well as the Phaedrus (275c ff) , imitation and repre-
sentation, along with literature and writing, have not been considered good tee/me, if the latter is considered 
as an art of producing the clear, certain, and secure, namely the truth of being in its figure or the truth of the 
idea. Compare also Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," I 34ff. 
2 J. I refer here to Philippe Lacouc-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy's distinction between la p11/itiq11e (fac-
tical event of politics) and le politique (the essential question of the political), where today the latter with-
draws under the domination of the former, whose 01her name is technology. See "Le retrai t du politique" in Le 
retrait du politique (Paris: Galil~e. 1983), I 83-200; "Politique" in I.es fin.< de l 'lummw. A pnrtir du travail de 
Jacq11e.< Derrida (Paris: Galilee, 198 1), 494; "Ouverturc" in Rejo11erle politique (Paris: Galilee, 198 1). 11-28; 
Lacoue-Labarthe, "Transcendence Ends in Polilics," 270. 
• 
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material identity and dispersal of the social, where a certain phusis sup-
ports the actualizing praxjs, geo-political and locally situated, which pur-
posefully unites and separates the social in its material reproduction of 
itself, as self-identical totality or in empirical dispersal (techne in the 
sense of crafting social self-irnmanentization or substantial social "self-
realization"). At most, the reader of Neuromancer may imagine such an 
absolute and totalized technological irnmanentization of the social as a 
telos lurking in the drive towards human colonization of outer space, the 
general reworking of a11 of nature as a totality of technologically ordered 
and socialized matter, or those attempts at realization of the indestructible 
social body which appear central to the novel. Here one would recall not 
only the extensive ongoing refashioning of the human body via cryo-
genics, bio-technology, microbionics, prosthetics, or cosmetic and neural 
surgery, but also, in particular, the work of Marie-France Tessier and 
Ashpool, not to mention the acti vities of the Wintermute Al. Inversely, 
the reader could imagine this to be minored through the population of 
Neuromancer by an infinity of empirical individuals whose confl icting 
objectifications of phusis as so many things, or technological means 
toward certain ends (computer equipment, bank chips, cars, simstj rn 
players, razor blades, Zeiss Ikon eyes, myoelectrk arms as enhancement 
or replacement of certain body parts, cloning facilities or reproductive 
bodies, and so forth), cut up and divide sociality in a criss-cross web of 
local struggles over its material (dis)appropriation. 
Not only does technology not simply consist in such social actualiza-
tion of phusis. We should also not think that technology in Gibson's work 
simply and exclusively follows an inclination toward eidos, so as to sig-
nify a formalization of the social through a theoretical abstraction which 
achieves final closure, as a systematic, rational self-reflection and frag-
ments in a scattering of subjective ideologies whose irreducibly different 
logics fold the social back upon itself in its inconsistencies (in either case 
an ideal, formal, transcendent, and self-refl exive sociality). Sociality 
abstractly formalized as a full and closed technological system that 
reflects (upon) itself perfectly is something that readers may infer, albeit 
at the cost of a certain reduction of the complexity of the problem con-
cerning technology in Neuromancer, from what seems to be a central 
motif of Gibson's book, namely the thought of a fill shed and fu ll-fledged 
methodology, teleology, logical program, or ideal blueprint whose care-
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free turning upon itself would preserve and propel forward the spirit of 
sociali ty as an end in and for itself. One thinks here not only of the Ash-
pool paradigm, Old Ashpool's "compulsive effort... to replicate some 
famil y image of self' in an endless isolationist self-replication "gener-
ating a seamless universe of self. " (N, 179, 173) One recalls also Marie-
France's vision of a "symbiotic relationship" between human "animal 
bliss" and subjective AI decision-makers, her idea of "some clean hive of 
disciplined activity" where a self-conscious existence as artifici al intelli-
gence combines with an instinctively social , emotionally intense, and 
short-lived cloned human animal life-form: (N, 229, 217, 178) 
She imagined us in a symbiotic relationship with the Al's, our corporate decisions made 
for us ... Tess icr-Ashpool would be immortal, a hive, each of us units of a larger 
entity ... (N, 229) 
Conversely, these exemplary proposals in Neuromancer for the closure of 
an ideal technological sociali ty each time breaks up, from the inside, into 
separate ideal projects. This is the case when Wintermute manipulates 
Lady 3Jane, when the latter turns against her father, and when she, other-
wise part of his cloning program, finally dissolves family unity and his 
hold on the ruling technological paradigm. It is also the case when Marie-
France's technological vision exceeds itself, when Wintermute and Neu-
romancer shed her ideal project to forge their own unprecedented type of 
social existence. 
Thus, when the reader finds in Neuromancer that any practice of artic-
ulation is posterior to a certain mimetology of tech.ne, the latter does not 
take the form of any absolute prevalence of material technics over tech-
nological idealization, or vice versa. Rather technology as mimesis 
inhabits articulation doubly, constitutes a duplicitous economy there. 
Technology institutes in practices the tension between eidos and phusis in 
which they are suspended. As the exterior inside (of) practice, technology 
must, on the one hand, be the fabrication (presentation, Darstellung, or 
poiesis) at once of a complex chain of analogical relationality which 
enables the equivalization that structures a hegemonic sociality and of the 
deep store of non-integrated analogies which enables the ongoing equiv-
alization of minor or resistant social formations. 
Let us take as a first example Wintermute in its improvisatory hege-
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manic relation to protagonist Case. For its attempt at achieving a struc-
ture of equivalence adequate to the necessities and demands of its current 
situation, here to control Case as part of the assemblage of protagonists, 
Wintermute depends upon a prior fabrication of such a complex chain of 
resemblances that would be capable of assimilating Case's antagonism 
by establishing a certain structure of equivalence between them to make 
them seem as two sociali ties with the same intentions. Two other signal 
instances also illustrate such fabricative chains. One recalls Wintermute's 
dependence, when communicating with Case, on fabrication of ad hoc 
"spokespersons" out of his memories, later related to Case through simu-
lated stimuli. Case, in his turn, can either try to hegemonize other social 
formations or turn to hitherto non-integrated simulacra interior to the 
social, and in both cases equivalization will depend on an earlier techno-
logical fabrication of relational structures of resemblance. Secondly, a 
certain interface is necessary between targets and the intrusion programs, 
killer-virus programs, or icebreakers, which try to exploit this priority of 
technological fabrication over articulation of equivalence. As the reader 
is told, the Kuang Grade Mark Eleven, which figures prominently as a 
social actor in the novel, proceeds to "interface with the ice so slow, the 
ice doesn ' t feel it" according to a strategy of fabricating resemblance: 
"The face of the Kuang logics kinda sleazes up to the target and mutates, 
so it gets to be exactly like the ice fabric. " (N, 169) 
On the other hand, techne as representation must also inhabit practice 
as an unweaving. Not only an unweaving of the relations of resemblance 
which breaks up the complex chains of equivalence of a hegemonic 
social formation in a dispersal of difference. But also an unmaking of any 
and all social formations on the background of the infinite stack of differ-
ends that enables the subversive differentiation of the social.22 The key 
transformational point in the plot of Neuromancer seems to take place, on 
the basis of a fabrication of resemblance adequate to the activation of the 
Teshier-Ashpool ceremonial terminal in Villa Straylight, as the practical 
articulation of a certain fragile and momentary equivalence between Case 
and Lady 3Jane: 
22. This heap of representations is analogous to that " reserve,'' "fund," or "deep background" of "the 
opposites and the differends that the process of discrimination will come to carve out" which Derrida calls the 
"pharmacy." Cf., Dcn-ida, "Plato's Pharmacy," 127- 128. 
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and his voice the cry of a bird 
unknown, 
3Jane answering in song, three 
notes, high and pure. 
A true name. (N, 262) 
And through them, this is, in addition, the equivali zing meeting between 
Wintermute and Nemomancer, aristocratic corporate family empire and 
protagonists, Marie-France and Old Ashpool, Als and protagonists, and 
so forth, at the point of the formation of the new entity as one hegemonic 
sociality out of these. This is also, however, the most extensive inclina-
tion of social practice towards an unweaving of the fabric of resemblance 
underlying this large structure of equivalence, so as to disperse its hege-
mony in a number of differentiations. It is the point at which each inte-
grated structure of equivalence, such as those formative of Wintermute, 
the Tessier-Ashpool family, and the group of protagonists, are unwoven 
and dissolved along the axis of internal differends. 
Given the double pull of these demands to be at once resemblance and 
differend, representational technology can rest with neither. If Neuro-
mancer shows its readers that techne cannot remain either with fabrica-
tion or with unweaving,23 this is because of their implication in a mutu-
ally dependent economy where each presupposes a certain (un)making of 
the other.24 Jn order for fabrication to get under way there must be an inte-
rior and prior unweaving, constitutive of the differences upon which fab-
rication draws - yet apprehended as a challenge to presentation and as a 
foreign element to be expul sed by (the impossible practical closw·e of) 
the given social formation. Inversely, unweaving always already operates 
on the "ground" of an earlier fabrication that enables the articulation of a 
social formation as equivalent to itself. A fabrication that is nevertheless 
23. One will recall thal, al least since Plato's definitions in the Stares111a11 (280a ft) , weaving is the arl that 
both cnahlcs and rules out all attempts al protection, including dialectics. Cf., Den-ida, "Plato's Pharmacy," 122. 
24. Facing realist and idealist criticisms of contemporary economics and their commodity forms, my 
approach would be to articulate the priority of representational or technological economics in all their insta-
bility. ls it not the case that Gibson's novel opens up a relation to postrnodcrnism itself, as Jameson has indi-
cated, by taking to the limit a s imulation of the technologies whose economical uncertainties arc at stake in the 
gco-political practices of Western, postmodern social culture? Compare the analysis of commodity fetis hism 
in De1Tida, Specters o,fMarx, 45ff, 147ff; and the relevance of notions of faith, belief, and trust for ana lyses of 
the contemporary market, as the recent debates on the (pure) gift have also shown, cf., e.g .. De1Tida, Given 
Ti111e: 1. Cu1111te1.feit Mo11ey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). passim. 
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here experienced as an opening towards an infinite social differentiation 
interior to the social body. 
Thus, we are called upon to (re)read Neuronumcer as an allegory of 
how technology must consist in a relation that cannot be made, in a cer-
tain impossible economical shuttling movement of relation between fab-
rication and unweaving, where, in their prior mutual articulative implica-
tion, fabrication relates unweaving to itself internally by making the limit 
of practical equivalization and where unweaving relates to the fabrication 
interior to itself by unmaking the practical resistance of differentiation. 
This economical shuttling or shimmering between resemblance and dif-
ferend constitutes that ambivalence of technology which readers of Neu-
romancer cannot have done with. 
The matrix, or cyberspace, is the main motif in Gibson 's work of such 
technological ambivalence, of the way in which representational techne 
constitutes a certain indeterminate trembling internal to all practices of 
articulation. Cyberspace is the presentational fabric that enables a certain 
equi vali zation of the social. The matrix is a web of relations of resem-
blance, an economy of information or data exchange underlying practice, 
which enables eguivalization of the social as formations of subject posi-
tions for representational perception or simulated stimuli: 
The matrix is an abstract representation of the relationships between data systems ... 
bright geometries representing the corporate data. Towers and fields of it ranged in the 
colorless nonspace of the simulation matrix, the electronic consensus-halluc ination that 
faci litates the handling and exchange of massive quantities of data .. . 25 
But the matrix is also "consensus-hallucination," it is also a fabric 
infected and unwoven by differends that relegate it to the status of halluci-
nation, illusion, or simplification: " ... lhe cyberspace matrix was actually a 
drastic simplification of the human sensorium, at least in terms of presenta-
tion." (N, 53) The cyberspace matrix is at once the dissolution of the fabric 
of resemblance in phantomatic hallucination and its presentation and main-
tenance as it is " ... experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in 
every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts." (N, 51) 
25. er., William Gibson, "Burning Chrome," t96- l97. 
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With its cyberspace figuration Gibson's work thus sketches how con-
temporary Western practices of politics are technological through and 
through,26 how representational technology forms the horizon for prac-
tice, how it constitutes the practopia of the West today from within,27 or 
appears as "our historical context, political and personal."2R The radical 
interest of Neuromancer is here a matter of its portrayal, or discursive 
painting, of how this largely unacknowledged and anxiety-provoking 
socio-political existence of the West as representational technology today 
consists in certain inescapable technological ambivalences at the heart of 
social practice. This is something which Gibson knows very well, wit-
ness the very pointed and explicit remark on this topic in one of his inter-
views: 
My feelings about technology are totally ambivalent - which seems to me to be the 
only way to relate to what's happening today. When I write about technology, I write 
about how it has a lready affected our lives; T don' t extrapolate in the way l was taught 
a SF writer should ... My aim isn' t to p rovide spec ific predictions or judgments so much 
as to find a suitable fictional context in which to examine the very mixed blessings of 
technology. 29 
Accordingly, the images of cyberspace in Gibson's work go to show us 
that fabrication and unweaving constitute "very mixed blessings," that 
they remain suspended in the impossible attempt to give to the other what 
is due. In other words, in this cyberspatial economy, this shuttling 
26. There is broad critical agreement upon the centrality for sociality of techno-politics in Ne11m111011cer. 
Cf., Csicscry-Ro11ay, 190-19 1; Easterbrook, "The Arc of Our Destrnction" Science Fiction Studies, 1992, 
19:3, 379; Miriyam Glazer, "What ls Within Now See11 Without" Jo11ma/ of Popular Culture, 1989, 23:3, 
157-163; Glenn Grant, ' 'Transcendence Through Dctournement in William Gibson's Neuromancer" Science 
Fiction Studies, 1990, 17: I, 45, 47; Hollinger. 204-205, 2 15. 2 18: David G. Mean. "Te.chnnlogical Transfigu-
ration in Will iam Gibson's Sprawl Novels" Extrapolation, 199 1 Winter, 32:4, 350-361; Nixon, "Cyberpunk: 
Prepming the Ground for Revolution or Keeping the Boys Satisfied?" Science Fiction Studies, 1992, 19:3, 
225-229; Suvin, 353-354; Whalcn,75ff. 
27. On superimposition of the to tal domination of politic.' and the total domination of technology in the 
contemporary epoch, see Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's remarks on the Heideggcrian analysis in "Le retrait 
du poli tiquc," l87ff. See a ls<> the passage on the necessity that any attempt at social unification at least since 
the German Romantics must have an articifical character in Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, 93ff. 
28. Cf., Teresa de Lauretis, "S igns of Wo/ander" in eds. de Laurctis, Huyssen, Woodward, The Teclmo/og-
icol Imagination (Madison: Coda. 1980), 167. Compare Hollinger, 203. 
29. See McCaffcry, 274. 
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between fabrication and unweaving in which technology attempts to rep-
resent the ideal and the material, the inte11igible and the sensible (to each 
other, to themselves), we experience a certain impossibility of represen-
tational technology. By tracing through cyberspace the impossible double 
demand for representation of ideality in the material and vice versa, in 
general and in each case, Neuromancer figures the (un)making of tech-
nology. 
In the arrival of the new entity, Wintermute "had meshed somehow 
with Neuromancer and become someth ing else." (N, 268) With the new 
entity, the reader of Gibson's work is asked to ponder the presence of a 
figure of social (im)materiali ty in and as cyberspace, a correlation where 
"Wintermute was hive mind, decision maker, effecting change in the 
world outside" and where "Neuromancer was personality. Neuromancer 
was immortality." (N, 269) When the new entity can tell Case "I'm the 
matrix," the reader must start to wonder whether the "very mixed bless-
ings" of technology are not inhabited in each case by this new entity 
which seems to hover as a hegemonic social formation somewhere 
between fin ite worldly presence and infinite spiritual absence. (N, 269) 
Following up on this experience of "mixed blessings" or aporias of 
technology, we may begin to intimate that these stem from the new entity 
as a social simulator, a prior process or space of repetition that must and 
yet cannot possibly come altogether into presence, or that which Derrida 
also calls "the space of the alteration of the originary iteration."30 We 
encounter these aporias in Neuromancer first and last because representa-
tional economies of technology are always already (everywhere, in all 
places) inhabited and spanned by the new entity, by a certain iteration of 
space and time, an impersonal and non-anthropocentric spatio-temporal 
repetition which is at once a matter of presencing and disappearing, 
coming and guing. 31 Thus one might say that Neuromancer constitutes a 
prayer to be read because testimony must (yet cannot) be given to its play, 
30. Cf., Derrida, OfGrammatology, 209. 
3 I. Cf., "The living ego is auto-immune, which is what they do not want to know. To protect its life, to 
contilllle itself as unique living ego, to relate, as the same, lo itself, it is necessarily Jed to welcome the other 
wi lhin (so many fig ures of death: diffcrancc of lhe teclmical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, 
synthetic image, s imulacrum ... )" Derrida, Specters ofMm~r. 141 (My emphasis). For various deconsJructions 
of humanist subjectivity, see the contributions in Who Comes after the Subject?, eds. Cadava, Connor, Nancy 
(New York: Routledge, I 991 ). 
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through the new entity, at this iterative heart of sociality, because we must 
(fail to) witness its play at a social simulator, in the sense of an imperson-
ating spatio-temporal recursion which makes (im)possible the existence 
of economies of technology. In Gibson's novel, the new entity as social 
simulator is an exploration of the representational (im)possibi1i ty which 
opens and closes the hiatus between presencing and absencing.32 
As one suspects at this point, in Gibson 's work this simulation is not a 
matter of pme presence repeated in its self-identity, nor of absolute 
absence repeated in its difference from everything. Being between these, it 
cannot rest with its iteration of a presentation (a re-presentation) adequate 
to efface absence momentarily, in some places; it cannot rest with giving 
time and space to such an analogical fabric between eidos and physis as 
may enable the equivalence which in turn allows a constitution of commu-
nity. Nor can it just stay in its iteration of withdrawal into absence, so that 
there are only unweavings of all fabrications in economies of technology 
through practical differentiations that fissure social formations internally 
again and again. To approach this between of simulation differently one 
might say that the new entity as social simulator not only constitutes, 
against the background of infinitude a field of finitude or a deep stack of 
representations on which its economy of technology draws, along with a 
certain practice and social form of existence. It also deconstitutes all these 
representations from within as their interior absence. But in its play a sim-
ulator also shows up one as condition of the other and vice versa. 
Capable of staying with neither of these, yet required to time and space J 
both, the new entity as social simulator plays instead. It plays along with 
representations. Deep in the iteration of presentation a certain ineducible 
return of absence unceasingly opens gaps in the presence of representa-
tions, just as the iterations of absentuation unmake representations in a 
pass tuwan.l the supplementary presencing that imprints an irreducible 
form on absence from within. 33 
32. My use of such terms as "imaging," "simulation," "analogy," etc. demands an explication of the 
1vriti11g of Gibson's text. I reserve such an explication for another piece. 
33 . This play of the simulator is virtually more actual than living presence and less unreal than empty pos-
sibility or pure death. Play incorporates and destroys in advance the unpredictabil ity of new knowledge, eco-
nomic techniques, po li tical givens, and social formations. IL plays al a speed irreducible lo the opposition of 
the act and the potential in the space of the event. Compare , Derrida, Specters ~f Marx, 13, 63. 
\ 
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If, in the final analysis, the social simulation to be figured by the new 
Wintermute-Neuromancer entity in Neuromancer is impossible, thi s is 
because repetition not only gives space and time to representation by 
repeating absencing in each presentation and repeating presencing in 
each absentuation, but also repeats itself in a hegemonizing and separa-
tive play between these. Repetition repeats by (de)forming itself hege-
monically according to the aporia of representation; the social simulator 
integrates in itself and releases from itself any number of simulations, 
includes and excludes other simulators. Repetition subversively shatters 
and gathers itself by repeating itself aporetically: multiple simulators -
multiple repetitions of representational aporias - free themselves from 
and get caught up in hegemonic social simulators. But it also repeats 
itself playfully, as the deep reserve, as the coming and going of repre-
sentability, between a hegemonic social simulator and its many separate 
others.34 
With Neuromancer repetition must be thought not only as the social 
simulator, as that aporetic of representation in the economy of technology 
which causes the practical articulation of social form, at the limit of total-
izing finitude, to fold back upon itself in a shattering indication of its 
others. Repetition must also be thought as what always already folds 
back upon itself in freeing and interlocking social simulators or repeti-
tions of representational impossibilities in technological economies - as 
that in technological economies which makes all practical articulations of 
social formations go out of themselves (through their interior) toward 
other social simulators and their representations. 
Towards the close of the novel, the new entity, as a social simulator 
with a certain claim on hegemonic social aggregation, can report to pro-
tagonist Case: "I'm the sum total of the works, the whole show." (N, 269) 
However, this new entity is also what finds its others in the heart of itself 
by relinquishing protagonists, the T-A family corporations, and many 
others, or by shattering itself into the multiple voodoo deities that readers 
encounter in Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive, the other two novels 
in the matrix trilogy. The new entity is also that setti ng in motion of an 
34. Cf., Derrida on the supplementary relation between repetition and (un)truth, "Plato's Pharmacy," I 68-
169. 
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entire politeia towards its constitutive others which Derrida mentions in 
the epigraph above - the geo-political city of Earth in solicitation of 
others across the universe, or a becoming-centaur35 as a first move toward 
detailing the others of the new entity, toward tracing the contour of 
"Alpha Centauri":36 
"I talk to my own kind ... " 
"There's others ... " 
"Centauri system." (N, 270) 
Inversely, in this "State's movement of going out of itself," as Derrida 
calls it, in the subversive freeings of social simulators, or in the insis-
tence of representational impossibilities, repetition must also be thought 
as the formal closures or unifications of technological economies which 
practically articulate formations of social simulators according to a 
hegemonic logic. In that sense, Gibson's work offers up all its characters 
and social formations - men in the street along with corporate 
employees, rastafari space-inhabitants, zaibatsus, protagonist groupings, 
families structured as corporations, artificial intelligences, etc. - as so 
many social simulators linking up through representational technologies 
at the limit of their resistance to each other. This would be so many 
implicit reminders that readers participate today as social simulators in 
an economy of technology, that at the end of separation we are involved 
by repetition in a search for a hegemonic formation interior to the social 
that is not too dissimilar to that incomprehensible event, that enjoining 
of complex artifical intelligences between Wintermute and Neuro-
mancer. 
However, formation of hegemonic social simulation and fragmentation 
of multiple antagonistic social simulators occur only on condition of their 
mutual inclination toward each other. On condition, that is to say, that 
social simulation plays itself out between these, that the unnameable or 
35. With the centaur, Greek mythos is being reactivated here - forming an originary hybrid cquivocity, a 
most bright technological monster o f j ustice between man and animal, the mundane and the sacred. 
36. On a first reading, Alpha Centauri might appear as one of these classic fi gurations in science fiction of 
the social altogether other to be identified. Considering later events, notably the shattering into deities and 
other characters' unceasing preoccupation with 'the event,' one should suspend that judgment. 
T 
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absolute other plays (in) repetition, both ways.37 To witness this play -
sometimes serious (spoude) iteration tending toward one hegemonic 
sociality, sometimes the parodic game (paidia)38 of multiplying copies, 
ghosts, or phantoms of our social existence - through a reading of Neuro-
mancer, is the chance given to the reader to experience (our) social simu-
lation as necessarily (ananke) condemned to the vain and infinite pursuit 
on the field of finitude of representations of its exterior as absolutely 
other, as necessarily falling short of simulating the non-simulatable, or as 
necessarily abandoned by repetition itself at the limit of an onto-theology 
of representational art: facing the impersonal unmoved mover of 
techne. 39 A short exchange between Case and the new entity illustrates 
the abandonment in this way: "'So what's the score? How are things dif-
ferent? You running the world now? You God?' 'Things aren't different. 
Things are things."' (N, 270) 
We therefore read Neuromancer in an attempt to accede to its reactiva-
tion of "mixed blessings," irreducible ambivalences, or those plays of 
repetition in representational art and the economy of technology. We con-
tinue to go to Neuromancer to receive its formal indication of repetition 
37. My notion of social simulation is similar to that spectrality between spirit and fetish which Dcn-ida 
remarks in Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), passim . See also Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 129n.5. As Jameson notes, this notion of spcctrality may be 
approached as Derrida's attempt to find an alternative to the "false problem" of an opposition between certain 
versions (humanist traditionalist pathos versus nihi listic postmodernist repression of his tory) of the 
modern/postmodern d istinction, in that it moves toward an analysis of " postmodern" figuration according to a 
notion o f temporalily that bypasses ontologies of presence and absence as well as their attendant concepts of 
the ideal and the material. Cf., Fredric .Jameson, "Marx ' Purloined Letter," unpublished manuscript, 23-30. 
Gibson's novel is an exemplary story of the event that brings t he modern/postmodern distinctio n into play, i.e., 
the event, caesura, or Ereig11is in which the West with its idea of art as tee/me attempts to have done with 
itself, by means of ils.elf. On the caesura and Ereignis , compare Lacouc-Labarthe. . Neidegf?eJ; Art and Politic.v, 
4 1ff. 
38. Cf., Derrida 's remarks on double affirmation: " It imp lies repeti tion of itself, which is also threatening, 
because the second 'yes ' may be simply a parody, a record, o r a mechanical repetition ... The technical repro-
duction of the originary 'yes' is from the beginning a threat to the living origin of the ' yes.' So U1e 'yes ' is 
haunted by its own ghost, its own mechanical ghost, from the beginning." Cf. , "The Villanova Roundtable: A 
Conversation with Jacques Derrida" in ed. John D. Caputo, Decn11structio11 i11 a Nutshell (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1997), 27-28. This is perhaps the place to recall Bernard Stieg ler's general point 
that the what invents the who as much as it is invented by it. Cf., Ilcrnard Stiegler, La technique el le temps, /: 
Lafa111e d' Epi111ethee (Paris: Galilee, 1994). 
39. One remembers the absolute privilege of theology in any analysis of ideology. Cf., Denida, Specters of 
Mm:1-, 148. 
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itself, its honoring of the name. To read in this indication, once again and 
in parallel with such explorers of "the event" as Bobby Newmark and 
Gentry in Mona Lisa Overdrive, that, oscillating between double exclu-
sion (repetition is neither one nor many) and participation (repetition is 
both one and many), that name is safe with it.40 
40. Cf. , Derrida. 011 the Name, 91. 
